2004 FENNER CONFERENCE ON THE ENVIRONMENT
Understanding the populationenvironment debate: Bridging disciplinary divides
The Shine Dome, Canberra, 24-25 May 2004
Session 1: Questions/discussion
Richard Grove: I am interested in Dr Dare's comment on Carolyn
Merchant, because I think it is very important to the whole of this conference.
He points out that Carolyn Merchant sees in a very pejorative sense the
development of resource use strategies since the 17th century, as a direct
product of positivist Newtonian thinking. Merchant sees it in an entirely
negative way, that it gave rise to patterns of resource use that have
landed us in the sorts of situations we are in now, which are not sustainable.
I would like to take a slightly more optimistic point on this, and
simply as a comment. I think Carolyn Merchant was probably completely
wrong, in that what Newtonian thinking did after the 17th century
and we can show this through looking at the environmental history of resource
use, which is a bit of a gap in this conference, incidentally is
that increasingly after the 17th century you have a whole series of people
being able to understand much better what the limits of resource use were
and what notions of sustainability might be.
Perhaps rather than looking at the history of philosophy it might
be more useful to take an empirical view of what the history of resource
use strategies has been, but I would suggest that Carolyn Merchant's view
as an environmental historian was a highly pessimistic one. What is perhaps
more useful to focus on is this: Dr Dare also mentioned Wilhelm von Humboldt,
but his brother, Alexander von Humboldt, laid the foundation for a very
rigorous critique of the way in which industrial society was consuming
resources in the 19th century. I think I am trying to say that a rigorous
environmental history of the last 500 years would teach us something about
the way in which these sorts of notions of sustainability have developed.
I think the danger in a conference like this is simply to see things
in a presentist way. The last talk we had shows how important a historical
analysis, for example of flooding, is. If you don't do the history you
won't understand the present.
Arran Gare: I mentioned Carolyn Merchant because she was the only
person on the history and philosophy of science who had addressed the
issue of the relationship between population and the environment. She
hadn't done that in very much detail, and I wouldn't like to be identified
with her views not entirely, anyway.
When it comes to Alexander von Humboldt, he was part of this development
of an anti-mechanistic way of thinking. I think he had a major contribution
to the development of ecology. You can trace back the various people who
formed ecology, and it almost all goes back to Alexander von Humboldt.
Richard Grove: It goes back a lot further than that, of course.
Arran Gare: Well, it might go back to Theophrastus, but the momentum
really began with Alexander von Humboldt. He was aligned with people like
Schelling and those who were trying to develop a post-mechanistic view
of the world. Their prime concern was to explain how it was that knowledge
was possible, and if you were a Hobbesian mechanical entity that would
just not be possible. Kant argued that you had to be some kind of self-conscious
entity. They took that position and said that Kant got it wrong because
it would have to be social, and then they said, 'Well, how could nature
be such that that kind of being could come into existence, could evolve
from nature?' So they were trying to present a much more coherent world
view than was developed by people like Hobbes.
What I am suggesting is that these fundamental divisions, which are really
the basis for, I think, transdisciplinary thinking, should be teased out,
appreciated, as rival positions. You need to look at the different sciences
to see where the schools of thought line up. The main stream of economics
is thoroughly Hobbesian-Newtonian-Cartesian, although there are rival
positions within it. Marx's whole critique of capitalism was based on
the influence on him of Hegel and Schelling, but he was writing a critique
of political economy, not a work on economics.
The institutionalists, strongly influenced by Peirce, were part of this
anti-mechanistic tradition. So were the ecological economists, who were
arguing that the economists had to take into account the second law of
thermodynamics. But it seems to me that these are just piecemeal approaches.
The whole development of human ecology is thoroughly in this anti-mechanist
tradition and it needs to be put forward as the framework for, I think,
formulating our most important public policies. If you allow it to economists,
we are going to end up just destroying the global environment.
Ian Lowe: I have a question for Cliff Hooker. Could you say
something about integration in the policy area, where it seems to me that
satisficing is well accepted but there are complications of different
spatial and temporal scales, different cognitive domains and different
priorities.
Cliff Hooker: The general problem of integration in that area
is that there is no point in producing a strategic analysis which is quite
unacceptable to the way the governance structure works, and the quick
answer is something like this. Just as I think Professor
Klein's argument, taken to its end conclusion, suggests that we should
rethink rather carefully and radically the institutional structures of
learning that is, universities for example around problems
and capacities rather than disciplines, it seems to me the solution to
your problem is to rethink governance structures so that multidisciplinary
problems become thinkable in the processes of governance, rather than
governance saying, 'No matter how the world changes or becomes more complex,
you will please present your policy analyses in terms of the institutional
processes we have in place.' That's the short answer.
We need a complex science of governance. We have a Neanderthal one, roughly.
Bryan Furnass: Thinking is a very painful process, and that
is why most people don't bother with it. We have been talking about thinking
in terms of external information being sorted in a very logical way and
then coming up with a consensus about integration. I agree with Cliff,
integration is very difficult, but the brain is doing it all the time.
We think we only use our brains by logical thinking, but humans aren't
really rational beings at all. Intuition is a much more important side
of innovation. We have heard about Archimedes and the Eureka principle.
There was the accident of Fleming finding a culture plate after going
away for the weekend if he hadn't had a holiday we might not have
had penicillin. There are all sorts of other intuitive ideas scattered
through science, and they sometimes take some time to develop. In other
words, they occur during leisure.
So I have two questions, perhaps, to Cliff. One is: do you think we
don't pay enough attention to intuition as a valuable source of scientific
inspiration? And the second thing is: perhaps we don't give enough time
to doing nothing. There are a lot of ideas that come when we are doing
nothing. Most of the best questions in this conference will probably come
when we are riding home on the plane.
Cliff Hooker: I am sure both of us can respond. Two quick comments,
one as an anecdote. When I returned to this country after many years of
teaching and researching in North America, the biggest difference I noticed
to my creativity was the fact that over there the summer holiday occurs
outside of Christmas and you can actually get away for a month, as I used
to do just take a canoe into the wilderness and vanish. When I
came back I had a huge burst of creativity that lasted the year until
I could go away again. Here the summer holiday is at Christmas. You are
never away anywhere for very long. And my relaxation time until intuition
makes free play is about three weeks, and it needs to be outside of human
symbols. Hence the 900 km Bibbulman Track. So yes.
The other comment, briefly, however, is that civilisation has been possible
only because we have invented public mechanisms that allow scrutiny and
systematic improvement. So, whilst we need intuition, we can't rest with
it. It has to be 'disciplined' is not the right word systematised,
made public and examinable and arguable. That is what I was trying to
examine.
Arran Gare: I am entirely in agreement with you on the importance
of inspiration. I think that creative thinking that creates new perspectives,
enables things to be integrated, is something that the logical positivists,
the analytic philosophers really leave out. They have no place for it,
whereas if we think of people like Schelling and Peirce, they are the
ones who argue for the centrality of that. Peirce argues for abduction,
and inspiration is absolutely central to it. So, if you are striving to
get that transdisciplinary framework, it has got to be based on creative
thinking that will involve a lot of intuition.
Lionel McKenzie: I think my question or comment is addressed
to both speakers as well, but it really comes from a history and philosophy
of science perspective. I could perhaps quote Thomas Kuhn's The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions, in which he describes how difficult it is
to change scientific thinking. He used the concept 'paradigm shift', and
he focused on the 16th century and the difficulty that Galileo had, even
in trying to promote the Copernican view of the universe, as threatening
him with burning at the stake. So this really comes back to the question
of dealing with paradigms of knowledge and how difficult they are to change,
particularly when we move out of the scientific area.
At present in Australia it seems we have a paradigm which says that
economic growth depends on population growth, and any impact on the environment
can be managed through technical innovation. That is the dominant paradigm.
There is another, competing paradigm which says that population growth
is inevitably going to bring environmental degradation and there is no
way that it can be managed by technological or engineering means or any
other adjustments we may be thinking about.
The question is that when you are allowing your thinking to be dominated
by one paradigm or you move to another, it is still going to be very unsusceptible
to rational discourse, disciplined discourse, information or argument
mapping all of these things are sooner or later going to come up
against the limits of paradigms, and perhaps we should be more conscious
about their power and the way in which power is used to maintain them,
before we can actually progress this discussion. Perhaps you would like
to comment on that.
Arran Gare: I entirely agree with you. It is one of the main points
I was trying to make that you have probably made a lot better. As to the
importance of appreciating these, work has been done since Thomas Kuhn
on the whole issue and he had actually, before he died, abandoned the
concept of paradigm because he thought it was too vague. It simultaneously
involved a number of things: the conceptual frameworks, the kind of tacit
knowledge that Polanyi talked about, the way in which institutions embody
a particular way of thinking. So, if you don't go along with a way of
thinking, you just get expelled.
But I think that what is required of people is the ability to appreciate
that there are these fundamentally different frameworks of thinking and
to learn how to move between them, and then what is involved in choosing
between them. It is not something that you can solve by deductive logic.
The dialecticians argue that they dealt with the problem, but I don't
think that it is as formal as that. It actually involves giving a place
to stories; this is the argument of MacIntyre. But anyway, I entirely
agree with you.
Cliff Hooker: Just a brief comment. Formal argument mapping is
not the only tool that we use to improve our processes. I move across
paradigms my whole educational life. One of the things you can do to get
people talking is to build an integrative model and say, 'Look, your kind
of interactions I can put in, and yes, you are right, under those conditions
it works that way. Your kind of interactions I can also put in there,
and under other conditions it works your way. But hey, once we've got
both in there, you'll see that there are ways that the world can be in
which neither of yours dominates. There's a different kind of dynamics
emerges. So can't we have everything involved? Put your input in.'
So there's another tool besides argument mapping: integrative model building.
And there are others.
|