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HIGH FLYERS THINK TANK Safeguarding Australia: Think Tank Report 4 April 2003 Summaries of presentations and discussions The purpose of the think tank was to bring together early- to mid-career researchers from a broad range of disciplines to engage in thinking about novel applications of existing science and technology and in identifying gaps in knowledge that might be addressed when applying science (including social science) and technology to safeguarding the nation. Officers of the Academy were present to facilitate discussion. The think tank focused on four broad areas of application, with four break-out groups:
Group A: Chemical and biological threats
Contents
Safeguarding Australia: A national research priority
A perspective from the Defence Science and Technology Organisation
A perspective from CSIRO
A perspective from the Prime Minister's Science, Engineering and
Innovation Council: Working party on science and security
A perspective from the Australian Institute of Criminology
Applications of basic research: Flying robots inspired by insects
Chair: Dr Lynn Booth, Director, Strategic Analysis Policy, DSTO Raconteur: Dr Bob Godfree, CSIRO Plant Industry
B. Communications and information technology
C. Infrastructure as a target
D. The role of the social sciences
Safeguarding Australia: A national research priority In 2002 the Federal Government chose four national research priorities:
An Academy think tank prepared submissions on possible priorities which received serious consideration during the process of setting priorities. The priority on safeguarding Australia has four goals:
A fifth goal, suggested by social scientists, concerns global intelligence. The government is still interested in other suggestions. The purpose of this think tank was to encourage connections between young scientists in Australia. We heard ideas for new applications of research to the problems of security and multidisciplinary ways of solving these problems. This report outlines the ideas for the application of science and social science to the prevention of threats, their detection, responses to threats and recovery from them. It has been circulated to interested people and government agencies. Threats cover a wide scope; they could be emerging or spreading diseases in plants, animals and humans; accidents or acts of nature; or inadvertent or deliberate human acts. For more information on national research priorities, go to www.dest.gov.au/priorities.
A perspective from the Defence Science and Technology Organisation The Defence Science and Technology Organisation is part of the defence portfolio. It investigates future technologies and ensures Australia is a smart buyer and user of defence equipment. The organisation also supports existing capabilities, such as the ageing F-111 strike aircraft. There are three laboratories in DSTO, focused on platforms, systems and information sciences. Work areas include: maritime and air platforms, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence, weapons, missiles, early warning and radar systems, operations research, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, strategic analysis, networks, and command and control. Counter-terrorism is a small but increasing activity of the defence organisation. While the states are first to respond to an internal security incident, Commonwealth agencies provide overall coordination, and the defence forces would be called on if needed. Some examples of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation's research which may have application in counter-terrorism, although they are primarily directed at the Department of Defence, are:
For more information about the Defence Science and Technology Organisation's research, go to www.dsto.defence.gov.au/research/.
A perspective from CSIRO Australia is a large, isolated country with no land borders; these have given us a sense of security. But we also have a lot to lose. We need to have the ability to manage what happens. What is the role for CSIRO in safeguarding Australia? We need to work out the national research and development needs, match those with CSIRO capabilities and then decide what security research CSIRO should do in the future. After speaking to many agencies, CSIRO has found some common research needs:
More specific needs are:
Some CSIRO capabilities for safeguarding Australia:
For more information about CSIRO, go to www.csiro.au.
A perspective from the Prime Minister's Science, Engineering and Innovation Council: Working party on science and security The Prime Minister's Science, Engineering and Innovation Council set up a working party on science and security which reported in December 2002. The working party consulted experts on the threats from terrorism, surveyed Australia's relevant science and technology capability and calculated the gaps in that capability. The key finding was that Australia's science, engineering and technology community is not directly connected to our counter-terrorism needs. Established counter-terrorism support exists in the Defence Science and Technology Organisation. Relevant skills also exist in the defence forces, police and intelligence agencies. Analysis of the threat of terrorism is complex. Counter-terrorism has four phases:
Finding the capability of a terrorist group requires information on personnel, organisation, facilities, training, equipment, procedures, finance and motivation. Methods the terrorists employ could be:
Their targets could be:
The working party recommended a framework to enhance collaboration between the science and technology community and counter-terrorism operations. A science and technology unit should be formed with additional research funding. The unit would support counter-terrorism capabilities, coordinate national and state requirements and analyse the vulnerability of critical infrastructure.
The full report of the working party on science and security is available at
A perspective from the Australian Institute of Criminology The four ingredients of crime and terrorism are:
Crime can be prevented by reducing the supply of motivated offenders, reducing opportunities and making crime harder to commit. Investment in child development can reduce the supply of offenders. Opportunities can be reduced through town planning, building design. Fraud and other economic threats can be controlled by regulation and the creation of a compliance culture. Research in social science can enhance the social fabric and respect for the rule of law. Declining trust in social institutions has produced fertile ground for offenders. Social norms and values help regulate the conduct of people. Social science can also assess and communicate risks, helping to manage the fear of crime. Domains that need safeguarding are homes, neighbourhoods, workplaces, economic and financial institutions, and national borders. Border threats include the smuggling of arms, drugs and people, identity fraud, internet fraud and globalisation, which breaks down borders. But the focus on borders should not dominate our responses – terrorists don't always come from elsewhere. We need social infrastructure in local communities. Who determines risks? Who is at risk? How are risks perceived and measured? Understanding the psychology, sociology, geography and politics of risk is a key component of the nation's response to terrorism. It is critical that the findings of science and technology are clearly communicated to the community, politicians and government officials. More on the Australian Institute of Criminology and its research is available at www.aic.gov.au.
Applications of basic research: Flying robots inspired by insects Despite their simple brains, insects have exceptional vision and navigation abilities. Can we adapt what they do to robots and vision systems? Because their eyes are so close together, stereo vision and the ability to judge distance is difficult for insects. They overcome this shortcoming by using the motion of images. When a bee flies down a tunnel it uses the optic flow of the texture of the wall to decide the distance it has covered. The way a bee measures distance is robust, not affected by a headwind. To make a soft landing on the ground, a bee flies slower as it gets lower. Basic research into the biology of bees has been combined with engineering to produce new devices. A panoramic camera can emulate the compound eyes of insects. It can find a way through terrain automatically without the need for radar (which sends out revealing signals). A robotic helicopter can stabilise its altitude using a camera's view of the horizon. The advantages of flying robots are that they are computationally simple, inexpensive, lightweight, hard to detect and able to go where people cannot. The research can be applied to aircraft, spacecraft, surveillance and security.
More information on Professor Srinivasan's research is available at
A. Chemical and biological threats First, identify the threat. Biological threats were classified as:
The unintended threats already cost billions in prevention and remediation. There are large numbers of continuing threats affecting large areas of land. Chemical threats include nerve agents, industrial chemicals such as chlorine and cyanide, toxins and blister agents. They also could be distributed into the environment by accident or on purpose. Biological threats tend to spread slowly and widely, with intentional activities hard to distinguish from natural events. Chemical threats are quick and shocking but easier to identify rapidly. The chemicals are usually confined to a small area. The first step in dealing with terrorist threats is to build a model, simulate events and see the effects of different threats, plans and responses. Building an accurate model would be a research project in itself. The results of scenarios would then show weaknesses in counter-terrorist capabilities and indicate what research is needed. Testing scenarios would also show the risks, costs and benefits of different approaches. Some concerns may be eliminated while others receive more attention. Scenario planning and exercising should include the technical experts who can help to identify the key weaknesses that could be addressed by research activities. The prevention of threats requires that great responsibility be placed on scientists who may release organisms from a lab or companies that may allow industrial accidents. Chemical threats can be detected by monitoring the sales and distribution of chemicals. Detecting biological threats is more difficult. Many biological agents are easy to collect, propagate and distribute. Quarantine and border protection can stop a small amount of biological material but not that which is already in the country. Research could develop vaccines against diseases and increase plant resistance. More taxonomists and databases – such as the international database of plant and animal viruses developed at the Australian National University – could improve the recognition and identification of threats. Public awareness of risks and scientists' awareness of laboratory safety and security could be increased. This depends on gathering information and making it accessible to the intended audience. Health databases could show an increase in a disease. An international database of experts would allow quick access and avoid the need to reinvent expertise. Tactics and technology need to advance hand in hand. When a threat has been detected, small rapid-response teams of experts with diagnostic tools could be sent out, requiring fieldable, rapid diagnostics tools for a broad spectrum of agents. Effective response also requires clear chains of command and communication, which could be aided by research into the appropriate command and control framework, and the application of improved technologies to provide appropriate real-time situational awareness during events.
B. Communications and information technology Terrorism raises global issues which require global collaboration amongst scientists from many disciplines. The first task is to develop a shared understanding of the issues. Then there is a need to balance prevention, detection, response and recovery strategies with quality of life. Where the strategies require community involvement, there needs to be a communication plan for disseminating the appropriate information. A trusted information source should be established and the dissemination of disinformation, for example by broadcast or by a website impersonating a government site, should be prevented. Prevention, detection, response and recovery should be considered dynamically; what is learnt in each phase should inform all the others. Sense and response should occur simultaneously in all phases, as in the following diagram.
Research topics Prevention Create and maintain an inventory of the critical systems and infrastructure which need protection. Accurately model a wide range of credible threat scenarios and unusual or anomalous event scenarios using computer simulation. Use the models to develop a range of possible responses and solutions to these threats; and prevention strategies. Detection Use the critical systems inventory and the models of threat scenarios and anomalous event scenarios to develop early-warning signs and detection techniques. Gather evidence and use non-specific anomalous event detectors to indicate the occurrence of a particular scenario. Link data in real time from disparate, cross-domain, national sources, leaving data in raw format to avoid imposing preconceptions. Develop analytic methods which look for unusual events, and related instances of such events. Look at trends at differing levels of abstraction. Develop tools for feeding information to levels where the information is further processed or used. Persuade institutions to liberate their datasets for security purposes. Develop trusted and assured mechanisms to control access and audit facilities that will support legislation on the use of government and private information. Otherwise, as experts in the US have highlighted, these amalgamated information systems in themselves pose a significant threat to our citizens' quality of life. Develop these tools and techniques within a legislative and policy framework and sensitive to privacy and cultural differences. Use a trusted agency, individual or team to conduct the analysis. Develop systems that support the building of composite models, that is, dynamically combine inputs and outputs from models in diverse domains such as road transport patterns and migration of a particular bird species, or bushfire models with critical infrastructure models. Develop techniques which rely less on message content and more on context – inferences made from surveillance and reconnaissance data. New technology such as quantum cryptography may make cipher cracking infeasible. There is also a desperate shortage of translators in relevant languages and dialects. Response Using the critical systems inventory and the models of scenarios, develop an automated response tool comprising flexible cross-domain components which would be combined in response to a particular situation. Response coordinated from local to national level would make use of all levels of information, especially local knowledge. Use the national information resource to monitor the response and adapt as necessary. Integrate research from the social sciences to minimise inappropriate community responses. Recovery Use the critical systems inventory and the models of scenarios to develop recovery plans. Study the vulnerabilities of critical systems and infrastructure. The increased interdependence of systems can introduce single points of failure. Study the characteristics of efficient and robust systems which can survive attack or failure and include them in the design of critical systems and infrastructure. Encourage the adoption of survivable systems by the use of standards and incentives. Study the impact of survivability on the triple bottom line for businesses and governments.
C. Infrastructure as a target Critical infrastructure is that infrastructure which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, will significantly impact on social or economic well-being or affect national security or defence. Infrastructure includes:
Threats to infrastructure could be terrorism, fraud and other crime, natural disasters and natural transfer of pests and diseases. Research, modelling and construction undertaken to counter terrorism will also be effective against natural disasters. Australia's National Counter-Terrorism Committee The National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC) was formed on 24 October 2002, when the Premiers, Chief Ministers and the Prime Minister signed the Inter-Governmental Agreement on counter-terrorism arrangements and flows from the decisions made by the Leaders' Summit on Transnational Crime and Terrorism in April 2002. NCTC reports annually to the Council of Australian Governments on Australia's preparedness to deal with terrorism and its consequences. The first report, commissioned by the Prime Minister, Premiers and Chief Ministers on 24 October, was delivered at the COAG meeting on 6 December 2002. A number of issues make these threats more complex and difficult to counter. Infrastructure is operated at several levels – national, state and local – and under different commercial or legal arrangements. Privately owned infrastructure has a different approach to costs and information-sharing. The types of infrastructure are interdependent – for example, water supplies depend on electricity, electricity depends on telecommunications – but some operators are ignorant of what services they depend on and what services depend on them. Many operators defer expenditure until a response is required, rather than spending on prevention and detection. This makes infrastructure more vulnerable to threats. Who should pay for prevention? It's going to cost billions of dollars. A cost-benefit analysis will not be accurate when the likelihood of a terrorist attack or the introduction of an agricultural disease is hard to quantify. Earthquakes and floods are easier to predict. Research topics Audit security weaknesses in infrastructure. Produce computer programs that recognise patterns in data and identify weaknesses and unexpected threats. Rank degrees of vulnerability. Does maximum efficiency (profit) require vulnerability? Can regulatory and financial market mechanisms be developed that increase the financial incentive to secure infrastructure? Develop a matrix of risk and consequences. Develop a matrix of risk and costs of reducing vulnerability – of building robustness and redundancy. Balance this against the cost of consequences. Improve access to data, its integration and collaborative use. Build scenarios and model front line responses in real time. Find methods to visualise or graphically present data and so better inform emergency services and public. Model the interaction and interdependence of infrastructure networks, including availability of repair facilities and spare parts. Find fragmentation between regions. Identify minimum operational requirements and ways to share resources between types of infrastructure and regions. Design more robust infrastructure and self-healing systems. Explore social aspects of prevention, detection and recovery – cultural variations and individual psychological responses. Raise public awareness. Find effective methods of command and control. Use existing mass media? Develop automated decision-making. Is this quicker and better than people in crisis?
D. The role of the social sciences We define social science to include not just psychology, sociology and criminology but also areas like economics, social work, management science, law and relevant humanities like political science and history. Thus defined, social science represents a body of expertise that is relevant to the prevention, detection, response to, and recovery from, terrorism. Indeed the social sciences study people, and terrorism is a phenomenon involving people be they victims, potential victims or perpetrators. While the social sciences cannot alone provide a solution to terrorism, they will be an essential part of any solution through multidisciplinary research. Prevention and detection We need to understand why people commit terrorist acts. To combat international terrorism we need to explore the root causes beyond the glib assumptions often made in the media. Australia has a considerable body of expertise in regional matters and this could be brought to bear through multidisciplinary area studies that draw together disparate bodies of knowledge into a coherent picture of a country or region. At home, we need to explore how the inclusive approach of multiculturalism can be further used to mitigate alienation and hostility within Australian communities. Overall, we need to research the social underpinning of how individuals come to see violence as a remedy to their concerns, especially among young men who often represent the active face of terrorism. In understanding the threat, we need to ensure that our risk analysis takes full account of social and economic factors and not just the easily quantified aspects of direct physical impact and cost. In communicating to the community about the threat we need to understand their fears and expectations. Social science can provide the tools to tailor public information programs and test their effectiveness. Response and recovery Human factors pervade every decision, command and implementation process. We need to understand how responses to terrorist acts can most effectively be coordinated taking account of the fallibility of the people concerned. The current tangle of legal responsibility for responding to terrorism further complicates the situation. These are problems where management theory, law and psychology are central. We need to understand how victims and the broader community can best be supported through difficult times. The fullest range of options for dealing with recovery from terrorist acts needs to be explored to determine the best mix of centralised and community-based programs. This could be informed through studies of communities recovering from disasters. The social sciences are essential to understanding the underlying causes of terrorism and therefore will inform strategies aimed at reducing its occurrence. When prevention fails, the social sciences can formulate short-term responses and recovery programs. Social science expertise should be used in contingency planning and counter-terrorism exercises. There is a delicate balance to be reached between the effective policing of terrorism and the protection of civil liberties. This balance will ultimately be determined through the political process, but it should be informed by the best advice available from the relevant disciplines.
The following important areas of research emerged from the focus groups and discussion. They underlie the prevention of and responses to terrorism and natural disasters:
Possible research areas and their application to safeguarding Australia are listed below.
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