HIGH FLYERS THINK TANK

Safeguarding Australia

4 April 2003

Focus group A. Chemical and biological threats

Chair: Dr Lynn Booth
Raconteur: Dr Bob Godfree

First, identify the threat.

Biological threats were classified as:

  • intentional
    • human diseases – viruses such as smallpox, other biological agents and toxins
    • agricultural and environmental – viruses such as papaya ringspot virus, fungi such as rusts, bacteria such as anthrax, weeds
  • unintentional
    • human diseases such as severe acute respiratory syndrome and Creutzfeld-Jakob disease
    • agricultural and environmental – genetically modified organisms, animals such as cane toads and fire ants, introduced diseases and plants.

The unintended threats already cost billions in prevention and remediation. There are large numbers of continuing threats affecting large areas of land.

Chemical threats include nerve agents, industrial chemicals such as chlorine and cyanide, toxins and blister agents. They also could be distributed into the environment by accident or on purpose. Biological threats tend to spread slowly and widely, with intentional activities hard to distinguish from natural events. Chemical threats are quick and shocking but easier to identify rapidly. The chemicals are usually confined to a small area.

The first step in dealing with terrorist threats is to build a model, simulate events and see the effects of different threats, plans and responses. Building an accurate model would be a research project in itself. The results of scenarios would then show weaknesses in counter-terrorist capabilities and indicate what research is needed. Testing scenarios would also show the risks, costs and benefits of different approaches. Some concerns may be eliminated while others receive more attention. Scenario planning and exercising should include the technical experts who can help to identify the key weaknesses that could be addressed by research activities.

The prevention of threats requires that great responsibility be placed on scientists who may release organisms from a lab or companies that may allow industrial accidents. Chemical threats can be detected by monitoring the sales and distribution of chemicals. Detecting biological threats is more difficult. Many biological agents are easy to collect, propagate and distribute. Quarantine and border protection can stop a small amount of biological material but not that which is already in the country.

Research could develop vaccines against diseases and increase plant resistance. More taxonomists and databases – such as the international database of plant and animal viruses developed at the Australian National University – could improve the recognition and identification of threats. Public awareness of risks and scientists' awareness of laboratory safety and security could be increased. This depends on gathering information and making it accessible to the intended audience. Health databases could show an increase in a disease. An international database of experts would allow quick access and avoid the need to reinvent expertise. Tactics and technology need to advance hand in hand.

When a threat has been detected, small rapid-response teams of experts with diagnostic tools could be sent out, requiring fieldable, rapid diagnostics tools for a broad spectrum of agents. Effective response also requires clear chains of command and communication, which could be aided by research into the appropriate command and control framework, and the application of improved technologies to provide appropriate real-time situational awareness during events.