On 17 January 2017 the Academy made a submission on the draft National Research Infrastructure Roadmap .
On 17 January 2017 the Academy made a submission on the draft National Research Infrastructure Roadmap .
Gene drive mechanisms (or gene drives) cause a gene to spread throughout a population at a rate higher than would normally occur. Scientists have been observing examples of biased inheritance generated by natural gene drive mechanisms for many years. However, significant advances in genetic and molecular tools for genome editing have brought synthetic gene drive technology within the reach of many more researchers, and research has accelerated greatly in recent years.
This discussion paper by the Australian Academy of Science considers synthetic gene drives in a specifically Australian context and highlights the potential benefits and hazards of possible applications, emphasising the need to eventually consider these within a risk assessment framework.
Gene drives produce a biased form of inheritance. They overcome normal Mendelian inheritance, where one copy of a gene is inherited from each parent, and greatly increase the chances of an allele passing from a parent to its offspring (Figure 1). This results in the preferential increase in the frequency of a specific genotype over many generations and the entire population may eventually come to possess only that genotype.
Scientists have been observing examples of biased inheritance generated by natural gene drive mechanisms for many years. The concept of a ‘synthetic gene drive’ was devised almost 50 years ago by Christopher Curtis who proposed using translocations (rearrangements of genetic material) to drive anti-pathogenic genes into wild species (Curtis, 1968). This idea was further developed by Austin Burt (2003; 2014), an evolutionary geneticist, who discussed how a synthetic gene drive could be used to prevent insects spreading diseases such as malaria.
Australia has a unique environment with highly diverse flora and fauna that have evolved in relative physical isolation over a long time period. A number of pests, diseases and invasive species that Australia has acquired from other parts of the world do not have close relatives in this country. This genetic differentiation and our well-established governance frameworks may make Australia an attractive setting in which to test synthetic gene drives that target pest species.
Despite the significant benefits synthetic gene drives may provide, an unplanned or poorly managed release of a gene drive modified organism could potentially change the environmental landscape well beyond the site of its introduction.
Based on available information, which is currently limited, there is very little public awareness of the term ‘gene drives’ or of the science and technology associated with this term. Negative attitudes to all genetic modification persist despite almost 30 years of GMOs being globally available, and many scientific studies providing strong evidence that there are no adverse effects to human health due to consumption of GMOs (Nicolia et al., 2014; NAS 2016b).
Gene drives have the potential to solve intractable problems in diverse areas of public health, agriculture and conservation but also present a range of social and environmental hazards. It is vital that the use of technology is open and peer reviewed, with research intentions made clearly transparent to the public.
The rapid advances in gene editing and gene drive technologies present substantial challenges to current regulatory systems that are under active consideration in numerous jurisdictions (Nuffield, 2016; NAS, 2016a; Secretariat CBD, 2015). There are important differences between gene editing and gene drives. As organisms with a gene drive may spread beyond geographical borders, this raises many questions including who should, ultimately, make the final decision on a gene drive release? And who bears responsibility for any negative consequences?
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